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CHARLES H. WILSON, JR., ESQUIRE
I have been invited here today to discuss a new endangered spe-
cies-Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.'
Those who were at the Washington meeting last year hardly would have
expected me to be describing title I in these terms. Last year's meeting
was held just 3 weeks after a three-judge court in New York unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of title I in the case of National Coalition for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris (PEARL).2 At that
time, we were looking forward to an inevitable appeal to the Supreme
Court, and hoped for a definitive resolution of the constitutionality of
title I.3 Unfortunately, there was a failure to file a notice of appeal with
the district court within the 60 days prescribed by the statute, and the
Supreme Court thereafter dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The consequences of that dismissal have been severe. At the time of
the lower court ruling in New York, four other title I cases had been
stayed, pending the expected decision by the Supreme Court in the
PEARL case. The assumption of the courts was that because PEARL was
the last of the three-judge cases, with a right of direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court, it would be the most expeditious vehicle to resolving the
issue of title I. The other pending cases were before single judge district
courts whose decisions would be appealed to the courts of appeal before
going to the Supreme Court. The dismissal of the PEARL appeal means
that those other title I cases are free to be appealed as the parties and
courts desire. Moreover, apparently anticipating the dismissal of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). The Act provides federal funding to local school districts
to make available remedial educational services to public and nonpublic schools. Id.
2 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. National Coalition for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PEARL].
' See Wilson, National Coalition for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Harris, 26
CATH. LAW. 209, 212 (1981).
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PEARL appeal, Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc. (Americans United), filed a fifth title I suit in Louisville, Kentucky.
Today, therefore, title I is under constitutional attack in five different
lawsuits.
Litigation, however, is not the only threat to the survival of title I.
Perhaps the most serious threat is currently before Congress. The Reagan
Administration has proposed legislation to consolidate funds, presently
appropriated under a number of education acts, into a single block grant
to the states." That legislation, if passed by Congress in the form pro-
posed, effectively will doom title I.
What I would like to do is review the status of the five pending title I
cases by briefly highlighting some of the emerging problems, and by out-
lining the strategy that we are trying to develop, in conjunction with the
Justice Department, to somehow control the movement of those cases to-
ward the Supreme Court.
Before discussing the status of the pending cases, I would like to ex-
plain their common issue and the basic source of the constitutional prob-
lem. In all five cases, the issue is whether it is constitutional for local
school districts to use funds appropriated under title I to hire and send
teachers, who are public school employees, onto the premises of parochial
schools during the regular school day to provide supplemental remedial
instruction in reading and mathematics.'
The difficulty with these cases stems from the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Meek v. Pittenger,6 a case involving a Pennsylvania statute, which
resembles title I. 7 Under the Pennsylvania program, special teachers
hired by local school districts were sent into the parochial schools during
the school day to provide supplemental remedial instruction. The Su-
preme Court ruled that the program was unconstitutional.$ The premise
for the Court's decision was that Catholic schools are pervasively secta-
rian in their operation.' The Court ruled that there was a risk, a danger,
S. 1103, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 4329-33 (1981).
See note 7 infra.
6 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
7 See id. at 352-57. In Meek, Pennsylvania laws that authorized the provision of textbooks,
instructional equipment and auxiliary services to nonpublic schools were challenged. Id. at
351; see 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-972 to -973 (Purdon Supp. 1982). The Court upheld
the loan of textbooks on the theory that these loans were made to schoolchildren, rather
than directly to the school. 421 U.S. at 361-62. The law authorizing the provision of instruc-
tional equipment was held unconstitutional as the equipment was loaned directly to the
nonpublic schools, which were primarily church-related. Id. at 362-66. The auxiliary services
section was struck down on the premise that direct involvement between the private school
officials and the teachers providing the services would result in unconstitutional entangle-
ment between church and state. Id. at 367-72.
8 421 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 371.
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or a potential that any person, including a public schoolteacher, treading
upon those pervasively religious premises, would be induced to inject re-
ligion into the context of his teaching. 10 The Court made the rather in-
credible statement that it is almost as easy to inject religion into a reme-
dial mathematics course as it is in a course in medieval history.1
The Court perceived a further potential risk in that there might be
disputes or disagreements over the content and structure of the remedial
courses between the principals of the parochial schools and the publicly
employed remedial teachers. These potential disputes and disagreements
could produce a type of unconstitutional entanglement. It is against the
background of those concerns that title I has been under attack since
1976 when the PEARL case was filed. On these grounds, the Court struck
down the Pennsylvania program."
Let me describe briefly the status of the pending cases. The oldest of
the cases is Wamble v. Bell, a suit which was filed in April, 1977, but
which was stayed pending the outcome of PEARL. The Wamble case is
somewhat unique in that it is the only case that has been filed challenging
the bypass provisions of title I." Bypass procedures were included in the
1974 amendments to title I and provide that if a local school district does
not provide equitable title I services to nonpublic school students, the
federal government will relieve the local school district of its responsibil-
ity and will make arrangements for providing those services through a
private contractor. 14
I must say that the Wamble case presents the biggest headache when
compared to the other pending cases. The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro
se, is an ordained Baptist minister and a church historian by profession.
As an historian, Mr. Wamble has a fascination for detail. He has taken
more than fifty depositions and has announced his intention to take at
least thirty more. In total, he has marked more than 1,160 documents as
deposition exhibits. We also have been served with approximately 232
pages of requests for admissions.
The fortunate part about the stay that was issued in that case was
that between issuance and dissolution of the stay, there was a change of
judges. The judge now assigned to the case, Judge Wright, has made it
quite clear that he will not tolerate, as his predecessor had, Mr. Wamble's
aimless and rambling discovery. We had a status conference on October
" Id. at 369-70 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971)).
" 421 U.S. at 370-71.
" Id. at 372.
" See 20 U.S.C. § 2740(b) (Supp. III 1979).
Id. The bypass procedure, as originally enacted in 1974, was embodied in 20 U.S.C. §
241e-1(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). In 1978, section 2740(b) was enacted to replace the re-
pealed statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 2740(b) (Supp. III 1979).
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31, 1980, and Judge Wright was visibly agitated with Mr. Wamble's run-
away discovery. He issued a rather unique order, directing the parties to
meet, narrow the factual issues in dispute, and come up with a schedule
for discovery, thereby moving the case toward trial. He also ordered that
no discovery take place until those negotiations were completed. We have
had sporadic talks with Mr. Wamble and Lee Boothby of Americans
United, who has represented the plaintiff-intervenors over the past 6
months. Incidentally, at the status conference, Judge Wright told Mr.
Wamble that he would not even read the 232 pages of requests for admis-
sions, let alone the responses. We are, therefore, not too concerned about
those requests.
A second title I case pending in Minneapolis is Stark v. Bell. That
case was filed in March, 1978, and named only federal officials as defen-
dants. Before it was required to answer, the Justice Department managed
to obtain a stay. The stay was dissolved in November, 1980, following the
dismissal of the PEARL appeal, and parents of parochial school students
were permitted to intervene in early March. We had a status conference
at the time the motion to intervene was heard, and the court has set a
trial schedule. We are to have all discovery completed by April 1, 1982,
and must be prepared for trial any time after June 1 of that year.
A third title I case is Barnes v. Bell, filed in Louisville in September,
1980. The unique feature of this case is that it is the first title I case in
which an archbishop, the Archbishop of Louisville, has been named as a
defendant. Also named were an assistant superintendent of schools for
the archdiocese, and eighteen parochial schools. We do not know why the
Archbishop was named as a party. A motion to dismiss on the ground
that no relief can be granted against the Archbishop recently was denied,
but with leave to renew the motion at a later time. Lee Boothby of Amer-
icans United is the lead counsel for the plaintiffs in that case. Since filing
the complaint, he has done absolutely nothing but oppose our motion to
intervene and the Archbishop's motion to dismiss.
The fourth case was filed by a group in San Francisco called United
Americans for Public Schools. The complaint was filed in March, 1978,
and again, named only federal officials as defendants. The Justice Depart-
ment was able to obtain a stay pending the outcome of both PEARL and
Wamble. Since the PEARL appeal was dismissed, neither the parties nor
the court have done anything to dissolve the stay.
Finally, there is a title I case, Felton v. Bell, pending in the Eastern
District of New York. The complaint, which is a virtual carbon copy of
the PEARL complaint, was filed in August, 1978. The named defendants
are two federal officials and the Chancellor of the New York City Board
of Education. As in the previous two cases, the stay was granted prior to
the filing of any answers, and again nothing has been done to dissolve the
stay since the PEARL appeal was dismissed.
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Of the five title I cases that are now pending, therefore, three are
relatively active, and two are completely inactive. In each of these cases,
however, we have uncovered problems that we did not encounter in
PEARL. In Wamble, for instance, the problems include the bypass con-
tractor's status as a nonprofit corporation. The problems are more serious
in some of the other cases, but because those cases have been relatively
inactive, the plaintiffs have not yet uncovered them.
That there are problems of a constitutional dimension in some of the
pending title I cases is significant for two reasons. First, we had assumed,
somewhat naively, that the title I program we defended in New York was
a model of title I instruction around the country. What we have discov-
ered is that there are great deviations from the PEARL model, and in my
view, the greater the deviation, the greater the risk that the program will
fail. I am not suggesting, however, that there are no programs that con-
form to the PEARL model. For example, in St. Paul, Minnesota, we have
found a program that is probably better than the PEARL program. In St.
Paul, there are fifteen certified teachers who provide title I instruction in
parochial schools. Nine of those teachers spend half of their day in paro-
chial schools and spend the other half in a public school. The evidence we
can produce there will be devastating. We will have nine teachers testify-
ing that "no matter which building I am in, no matter what time of day, I
teach my subject the same way, and there is no influence of that so-called
sectarian atmosphere on my teaching in the parochial schools."
The second problem that has been disclosed by these deviations is
that the policing of title I is really very loose. There is virtually no moni-
toring at the federal level. At the state level, so few resources are allo-
cated for title I administration that each local school district is substan-
tially free to do as it wishes. A consequence of this is the greater burden
it places on diocesan and archdiocesan school offices to scrutinize the way
title I is being implemented within their particular jurisdictions and to
discover incipient problems that could be intercepted before a lawsuit is
filed. As we all know, any changes made in a program once a suit is filed
will be viewed with great suspicion. Since the federal government is in-
volved in all five of these pending cases, one would think that, by now,
some overall strategy has been developed by the Justice Department to
move ahead the most favorable case and wage a successful defense of title
I. No such strategy exists. The Justice Department has assigned the five
title I cases to three different lawyers who have utterly failed to coordi-
nate their efforts.
I have previously mentioned the Felton case pending in the Eastern
District of New York. Not only is the complaint a carbon copy of the
PEARL complaint, but the naming of the Chancellor of the New York
City Board of Education as defendant suggests quite clearly that the
scope of the attack in Felton will be identical to that of PEARL-the
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New York City Board of Education's program. I proposed to the Justice
Department that it consider filing, simultaneously, a motion to dissolve
the stay and a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary
judgment would be predicated upon an affidavit from the Chancellor of
the New York City Board of Education stating that the title I program
for nonpublic school students in New York City is accurately described in
the record and opinion in the PEARL case, and that there have since
been no significant changes in the administration of that program. Armed
with the affidavit and with the record of the PEARL case, the proposed
motion for summary judgment would provide a vehicle to get the PEARL
record back into a court and on a track to the Second Circuit, and even-
tually the Supreme Court.
Our strategy is not to get any of these title I cases before the Su-
preme Court for a ruling on the merits. Our strategy is to find a case that
most likely will be held constitutional by the court of appeals. Such a
ruling by a court of appeals would require those challenging title I to seek
Supreme Court review by a writ of certiorari. If the program is held un-
constitutional by the Second Circuit, we have a right to appeal; if a
favorable ruling in the court of appeals is obtained, we would be delighted
to see the Supreme Court deny certiorari. The latter result will signal
that the Court is not interested in grappling with a constitutional chal-
lenge to a federal statute and indicate to other plaintiffs, or potential
plaintiffs, that they should concentrate their resources elsewhere.
If this strategy does not work, or if the Justice Department continues
to resist it, we have very little control over how the other pending cases
will develop. For example, the Minnesota case presents an interesting
concept. The plaintiffs' lawyers have decided that they will not limit their
challenge to Minneapolis and St. Paul. They intend to find other local
school districts that have bad programs. As I mentioned earlier, we have
found a very good program in St. Paul, and the burden will be shifted to
our side to find other good programs. If we go into court, and the plain-
tiffs show some obviously bad programs and we show some obviously
good ones, it will not be possible for that court to issue a Decker-type
injunction, that is, an injunction against the program. The most the court
can then do is enjoin those programs that deviate from the PEARL model
or fail to fall within the presciptions of Meek,15 thus, upholding the other
programs. I think that if the Minnesota case becomes the first to move
along, the risks of an unfavorable decision that would have nationwide
impact is minimized by the very approach the plaintiffs have taken.
In the Wamble case, we must contend with Mr. Wamble, who is
clearly restless. Although he has his teaching obligations during the regu-
'" Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); see note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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lar school year, summer is coming. Once he is free of his teaching obliga-
tions, we expect that he will be quite anxious to resume his seemingly
endless discovery. Frankly, I cannot predict how quickly the Wamble case
can proceed to trial.
The Kentucky case involves a relatively small program. We are ready
to go to trial on two weeks notice since we have done all of our pretrial
work. This case is the newest of the title I cases, however, and we are not
experiencing the same pressure that we are in Wamble and Stark. Thus,
we suspect that Wamble and Stark will move ahead, if we cannot carry
out the Felton strategy.
Everything that I have discussed could well be rendered academic by
Congress. Last week, the administration introduced in Congress the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Consolidation Act of 1981.1" That bill
is the Reagan administration's proposal for consolidating a large number
of federal education programs into what have been called block grants.
The money under these block grants is funneled to the states with fewer
strings than are attached to the present programs. 17 The Act repeals title
I and provides that it will take effect on October 1, 1981.'8 If it is enacted,
and if the repeal of Title I is retained in the bill, the five cases that I have
just discussed will become moot.
Additionally, I should alert you that the Act has far graver conse-
quences for nonpublic schools than simply the loss of title I. Title I is a
very significant federal program. Although no money flows to the schools,
the services provided by these remedial teachers is critically important to
many students in the inner city schools who need remedial educational
services. The major problem with the block-grant approach, however, is
that it makes noncatagorical all existing catagorical programs. By making
the programs noncatagorical, a state cannot be required to provide a par-
ticular form of service.
The Act specifies the constituency for whom programs can be devel-
oped under the statute, that is, children in areas that have high concen-
trations of educationally deprived students, handicapped students and
students attending schools undergoing desegregation. Those groups are
the beneficiaries of the block-grant proposal. The statute, however, sug-
gests only by example the types of programs that would be permissible
S. 1103, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 4329-33 (1981).
'7 Id. The bill is an attempt by the federal government to consolidate the 44 existing pro-
grams providing elementary and secondary education assistance into one program which
would provide block grants to state and local governments. Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation Consolidation Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Education, Arts and
Humanities of the Comm. of Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981)
(statement of Mr. Hatch).
is S. 1103, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 314, 127 CONG. REc. 4331 (1981).
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under the statute, and, therefore, does not restrict the states to the pro-
gram specified. I have reviewed the examples, and only one arguably
would pass constitutional muster under the present decisions of the Su-
preme Court. A program in which the local school districts provide addi-
tional in-service training for teachers in public and nonpublic schools
should survive constitutional scrutiny. There also are provisions for in-
centive payments to teachers who do a good job with the educationally
disadvantaged.19 Such a program would resurrect Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 °
if public money under such a program were paid to a parochial school-
teacher. In addition, the block-grant proceeds could be used for minor
repairs to school buildings.2' Under Nyquist,22 that type of aid is not
available to parochial schools. A consequence of the block-grant program,
therefore, apart from its impact on title I, seems to be the removal of a
significant number of nonpublic school students from participation in
federal education programs.
In summary, the prospects for the continued operation of title I for
parochial school students certainly are not as optimistic as they were a
year ago. With the problems encountered in the pending litigation and
legislation, it can be stated candidly that the future of title I is at best
uncertain, and at worst bleak.
11 S. 1103, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 204a-4(B), 127 CONG. REC. 4331 (1981).
20 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Kurtzman, a Rhode Island statute which provided a 15 percent
salary supplement to private schoolteachers was held unconstitutional. Id. at 607. The law
was enacted to foster the influx of competent teachers to nonpublic schools. Id.
2 S. 1103, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 204(a)(9), 127 CONG. REc. 4331 (1981).
22 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). In Ny-
quist, a New York statute providing direct subsidies to private schools for maintenance and
repair of equipment and facilities was held unconstitutional. Id. at 774-80.
